Business email compromise

What is business email compromise?

Business email compromise is fraud by email in a firm's name: a message that looks like the firm, or like someone the firm pays, asks for money to go somewhere new.

Last read from the sources at the foot of this page.

01

What does it look like at a firm?

BEC is a scam targeting businesses or individuals working with suppliers and/or businesses regularly performing wire transfer payments.

It arrives at the moment money is due. A client is told the firm's bank details have changed. A supplier's invoice comes with a new account. A closing wire, a builder's draw or a payroll change is redirected by one email that looks routine.

Nothing is broken into for the first two kinds below. The email is believed because of the name it carries. The money goes before anyone calls to confirm.

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded 24,768 complaints of business email compromise in 2025, with 3,046,598,558 US dollars in reported losses (2025 IC3 Annual Report (Internet Crime Report), pages 25 and 26).

In Canada the nearest category is spear phishing: a fraudster posing as a known sender so that money is sent. The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre recorded 813 reports from 571 victims in 2025, with 67,900,000 Canadian dollars in reported losses (Fraud Prevention Month 2026: Top 10 frauds based on reported dollar loss in 2025).

02

How is it done?

Three ways. A firm can meet all three in one year.

  1. A forged sender on the firm's own domain.The email shows the firm's real address. It is delivered where the domain publishes no DMARC rule asking receiving servers to refuse it, or one set to p=none.
  2. A look-alike name.The email comes from a domain one letter or one word away from the firm's, set up to send and receive mail. Clients rarely read an address letter by letter.
  3. A mailbox already taken.Someone signs in to a real mailbox at the firm or at a client, often with a password from an earlier breach or through a relay sign-in page, then writes from inside the thread.
03

Which of the three can be seen before the money moves?

Two of them leave marks in public records first. The forged-sender gap is in the domain's own published records, readable by anyone. A look-alike has to be registered, given mail records and often a certificate. Each of those is public before the first email goes.

For a firm we watch, look-alike addresses an attacker could register are checked every hour. Each day's public list of newly registered names is matched against its name overnight. In October 2026 Canada's Cyber Centre warned of callers posing as IT staff sending employees to sign-in pages whose addresses may carry the firm's own name.

Canada's Cyber Centre advises organizations to monitor for newly registered domains impersonating the organization.

The third way is not visible beyond the firm's walls. A mailbox taken over is used from inside. The call that sends someone to a relay page happens on the phone. What can be seen are the signs before it: firm addresses in breach data and lure names registered ahead of the call.

Public breach lists rarely show this fraud at all. A payment sent on a forged invoice is seldom a reportable data breach, so it does not reach the lists that count breaches. The FBI's loss figures are where it appears.

04

How common is the gap in a firm's own records?

LeakTrace index, readings to 8 October 2026: 3 in 4 of the professional firms we read have no published rule telling mail servers to refuse mail forged in their name.

That means no DMARC record, or one at p=none. The method, the dates and the figures by line of work are on the Index's own page.

05

What should a firm check this week?

Instruct employees to independently verify unexpected IT calls requesting MFA, passkey or password changes, regardless of caller ID or urgency

Three come first, each with what it changes, whether it can stay on and how to undo it. One more follows.

  1. The DMARC rule comes first.Steps: look up your domain's _dmarc text record; if it is missing or says p=none, move to p=quarantine once genuine senders pass, then to p=reject. What changes: forged mail lands in the receiver's spam folder, not their inbox, then is refused. Stays on: yes. To undo: set p=none again.
  2. The call-back covers what no record can.Steps: confirm any change of payment details by phone, on a number already on file, never one in the email. What changes: a changed payment waits for one call. Stays on: yes, as a written rule. To undo: retire the rule in writing.
  3. A look-alike is registered before it sends, so a watch can find it first.Steps: search for your name with one letter changed, a hyphen or another ending; note any with mail records. What changes: nothing in your systems. Stays on: repeat it monthly or have it watched. To undo: nothing to undo.

One more: what about the people who approve payments?

Move them to passkeys. Steps: in your sign-in settings, turn on passkeys or security keys for them and for administrators; tell staff IT never asks for a code by phone. What changes: sign-in uses the device, not a typed code. Stays on: yes. To undo: remove the passkey.

Sources

Where does this come from?

Related

Up to 350 look-alike addresses an attacker could register from your name, checked on each assessment.

76 attacker methods used against firms like yours, each checked externally on every assessment.

16 routes to your money, your clients, your accounts and your name, checked end to end on each assessment.

Attackers run AI agents in swarms: many at once, at machine speed, each trying thousands of combinations of these routes to find a way into any firm it can see. We read for the combinations first.

Everything LeakTrace reads about a firm, area by area, with what the firm receives and what we never do: Capabilities

Zero-access security intelligence

Security has always faced inward. LeakTrace is the AI layer that faces the attacker.

Four steps from left to right. Someone registers a look-alike address from your name, sets up mail or a sign-in page on it, then a message or a call reaches your people and money or a code goes to them. The watch reads the first two steps. The third is your own step: a call back on a number you already have and telling your customers how you ask for payment.

The watch reads here 1 Someone registers a look-alike address 2 They set up mail or a sign-in page on it 3 A message or a call reaches your people 4 Money or a code goes to them Your step: call back, tell customers The watch reads here 1 Someone registers a look-alike address 2 They set up mail or a sign-in page on it 3 A message or a call reaches your people 4 Money or a code goes to them Your step: call back, tell customers The watch reads here 1 Someone registers a look-alike address 2 They set up mail or a sign-in page on it 3 A message or a call reaches your people Your step: call back, tell customers 4 Money or a code goes to them

A look-alike address is registered from your name, then mail or a sign-in page is set up on it. Anyone can see both steps. Where an attack uses a look-alike address an attacker registered from your name, we see it first.

Under the watch, LeakTrace reads the look-alike addresses an attacker could register from your name every hour and the day's public list of new registrations each night.

When a name is not yours

With the watch, or for the names the look-alike response covers, we send the takedown request in your business's name once you approve it. The registrar decides. Your page shows its answer once it is recorded.

Under the watch, the name's first two steps are dated on your record: when it appeared and what it showed.

Every finding carries its evidence. The way we find it stays with us. The methodology, for a security reviewer.

What it cannot see

Some attacks leave nothing in public view: the call, the code passed on from a fake page, the mailbox someone is already reading. LeakTrace never goes inside a mailbox or a call.

Your own step: confirm every change of payment details by a call to a number you already have. Many fake sign-in pages carry no firm name at all and cannot be seen externally. A passkey or security key is what stops those.

Each step in four parts, on your line of work's page.

LeakTrace Index, readings to 8 October 2026: 3 in 4 of the professional firms we measured have no published rule telling mail servers to refuse mail forged in their name. Read the source.

See what is open before anyone else does.

We read your domain externally and show each way in with a check anyone can re-run.