Ukraine-supporting organizations and governments

How they got in, as reported. Email made to look like it came from a trusted sender.

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Date
30 Sep 2026
Who
Ukraine-supporting organizations and governments
The way in
Email impersonation
Source
BleepingComputer
01 · What was reported

What was reported.

Russian state-sponsored threat group Star Blizzard targeted more than 100 organizations supporting Ukraine across the US and UK using a new malware delivery tactic called RedFlick. The attacks utilized phishing emails containing password-protected archives to deploy the CosmicPulse backdoor via disguised shortcut files.

The way in the source reports: email made to look like it came from a trusted sender.

RedFlick attacks begin with a phishing email, such as an invitation, followed by a second message containing a password-protected ZIP or RAR archive.BleepingComputer, added to these pages on 2 Oct 2026. The source
02 · The way in

What forged email is.

Forged email is a message that shows a trusted sender's name or address while someone else sent it. The receiving server decides whether to deliver it. It follows what the real domain publishes about its own mail.

Attackers use it where a message moves money or opens a door: a changed bank detail on an invoice, a request to approve a payment, a link to a page that asks for a password. The message reads as routine because it arrives under a name the reader already trusts.

We read the records a domain publishes for its mail: whether it has a DMARC record, what that record tells receivers to do with a forged message and which services its SPF record names as senders. Those records are public and anyone can check them.

A reading of public records cannot see a message that was sent or received, the rules inside a mailbox or whether a person replied to a forgery. It shows whether the domain tells receivers to refuse mail forged in its name.

This part is true of every case of this kind. It says nothing more about Ukraine-supporting organizations and governments than the source does.

03 · What we check for it

What we check for it.

Whether anyone can send mail that passes as your domain.

04 · If this happens at your firm

If this happens at your firm.

  • Treat an email from a colleague that asks for a payment or a password as unconfirmed until you have spoken to them.
  • Tell your clients how your firm confirms bank details, so a forged email that asks otherwise stands out.
  • Confirm any request to pay or to change bank details on a number you already hold, never one in the email.
The attacks of 2026 and the habit that stops each →
For charities and nonprofits

What we read for charities and nonprofits.

  • The records that tell inboxes whether to refuse email sent as you (DMARC, SPF and DKIM), read externally.
  • Web addresses an attacker could register to look like yours, each checked: is it registered, is it set up for mail.
  • Breach records for addresses at your own domain, read externally; nothing inside is touched.
  • The mail records of every other domain your organisation owns, read externally.
  • The certificate your website answers with, seen externally: its name, its dates and who issued it.
  • Read with the assessment. What AI assistants answer about your organisation. A donor who asks an AI assistant about your organisation trusts the answer it gives. Assistants build those answers from pages they crawl. A look-alike address an attacker could register can be built to be crawled: its robots file invites the AI crawlers in and its page claims your name. Attackers manipulate AI answers to send your paying and enquiring donors to their own look-alike page, web address, sign-in page, phone number or email. In 2025, asked for the sign-in pages of 50 brands, an AI assistant gave addresses the brand did not control one time in three. The check is built to ask six assistants: Claude, ChatGPT search, Gemini, Perplexity, Grok and Copilot, through Bing. Monitoring asks again every week and tells you when an impostor's phone or address is in an answer. Source: Netcraft research, read on 4 November 2026.

The rule, from its source: What does each US state's data breach law ask a business to do?

Request your firm’s reading

See your own firm the way an attacker reads it.

We read your domain from public records and show each way in with a check anyone can re-run.

05 · Source

Source.

Source: BleepingComputer ↗

This page repeats what the source reported, with its date. It says nothing about any firm that is not named in it.